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Do Pluralist Power Structures Enhance Involvement in Decision-Making by 
Nongovernmental Organizations? 
 
Simon H. Okoth 
Zayed University 
                                  
Abstract: Previous studies conducted in the United States show that pluralist power structures 
lead to greater involvement by organized groups in issue-areas that affect communities. Given 
that pluralism is a procedural theory, broad stakeholder involvement thus depends on the 
effectiveness of the power structures. This article uses the Nile Basin Initiative project in 
Ethiopia, as case study, to explore the extent to which the presence or absence of pluralist 
structures influence involvement by nongovernmental stakeholders in the decision processes that 
affect shared water use. Analyses of qualitative data show that while theoretically the presence 
of pluralist power structures broadens stakeholder involvement, in practice it is not a sufficient 
condition. It is further observed that despite certain similarities in the way pluralism is defined 
and structured, the manner in which the pluralist power structures function depend on the 
degree of democratic openness at any given time and context. 
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Introduction 
This article explores the reasons why involvement by nongovernmental stakeholders in the decision 
making processes of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been missing in Ethiopia. A number of 
theories such as Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Olson 1965), Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (Ostrom 1990) and Pluralism (Dahl 1961) have guided researchers to better 
understand the degree of stakeholder involvement in public matters that affect their well-being.  The 
pluralist theory, in particular, has been applied to analyze whether the presence or absence of pluralist 
power structures influence the level of stakeholder involvement.  Some of those who have employed 
this theoretical approach includes Floyd Hunter (1963), Robert Dahl (1961), Wallace Sayre and 
Herbert Kaufman (1960), Aaron Wildavsky (1964), and Nelson Wikstrom (1993). Such studies have 
confirmed that pluralist power structures increase broad level of stakeholder involvement (Wildavsky 
1964; Olsen 1982; Yishai 1990; Mattila 1994; McCool 1995).   
Given that pluralism is a procedural theory rooted in Western democracies, this article 
explores whether the presence or absence of pluralist power structures explain the degree of 
stakeholder involvement in a developing country context.  In this regard, the Nile Basin Initiative‘s 
Water Resources Planning and Management project in Ethiopia is used as a Case study. The article 
proceeds as follows:  First, a statement of the problem is presented by examining the Nile Basin 
Initiative, its functions, and expectations. It further highlights the historical events leading to its 
formation before posing the research questions.  The second part of the article explicates the pluralist 
theory and how pluralist power structures can be used to assess the degree of stakeholder 
involvement. The third part presents the study method. The fourth discusses the findings, followed 
by discussion of those findings in part five. The sixth presents the conclusion. 
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Problem Statement  
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), temporary water compact signed in 1999 by ten African countries 
(i.e., Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic 
Republic of Congo) that share the River Nile basin, was created to enable the member states to share 
in the socio-economic benefits through joint projects (World Bank 2003).  Driven by international 
experience that joint investment projects by riparian nations can reduce potential conflicts,  the ten 
Nile Basin countries launched eight of the following projects:  Applied Training Project, the Nile 
Trans-boundary Environmental Action Project, the Nile Basin Power Trade, the Efficient Water Use 
for Agricultural Production Project, the Confidence-Building and Stakeholder Improvement Project, 
Socio-Economic Development and Benefit Sharing Project, the Shared Vision Program Coordination 
Project, and Water Resources Planning and Management Project (Nile Council of Ministers 2001). 
For the projects to be successfully implemented and for the benefits to accrue, involvement by 
nongovernmental stakeholders was considered essential.  Relevant studies from around the world 
show that such involvement enhances stakeholder trust and support for international water agencies 
charged with overseeing shared water projects (Bell and Jansky 2005; Bruch et al. 2005). Similarly, 
involvement by nongovernmental stakeholders adds value to decisions because of the grassroots 
information that they bring to the table (Creighton 2005).   
After more than a decade of its operations, the NBI is today caught up in a cycle of 
challenges that inhibit the success of its activities.  Foremost is the low level of involvement by 
nongovernmental stakeholders in the decisions that affect the design and implementation of the 
regional projects.  According to the World Bank (2003), charged with providing technical assistance 
to the NBI, without NGO involvement the projects will fail. Therefore, to enhance stakeholder 
involvement, support, and basin-wide ownership of the NBI programs, the Confidence Building and 
Stakeholder Involvement Project was initiated. The project employs public information and 
confidence building activities across all the member states (World Bank 2003).   
Another challenge is the transnational nature of the water agency and how to ensure that 
those who have the interest can fully engage in the decision processes.  Similarly, the different 
cultures, national political dynamics, history of involvement in individual countries, economic 
opportunities, and varied social values also pose the challenge to ensuring stakeholder involvement.  
Furthermore, the suspicion of organized groups by the governments create unnecessary rift between 
these two bodies that ought to be partners in development.  For example, such rifts existed in Egypt 
and Ethiopia during the most recent leaderships of Hosni Mubarak and Meles Zenawi respectively 
(Nile Basin Discourse 2008).  The level of suspicion has thus led some NGO representatives to assert 
that the Nile Basin Initiative operates in secrecy, thus limiting the space for stakeholder involvement 
(Kameri-Mbote 2005). 
The history of stakeholder involvement in the Nile water compact can be traced back to the 
colonial period.  In an attempt to ensure uninterrupted flow of the Nile waters into Egypt and the 
Sudan, the British colonial government signed two water agreements. The first was the 1929 Nile 
Waters Agreement signed between Egypt and the British government; the latter acting on behalf of 
Sudan and other upstream colonies in East Africa (Okidi 1994; Collins 2002; Tvedt 2004). Under 
that agreement Egypt allocated herself 48 billion cubic meters of the Nile waters and Sudan 4 billion 
cubic meters.  In the revised 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Egypt 
apportioned herself 55.5 billion cubic meters and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters (Helal 2012, 17).  
The problems with the two agreements were that they did not involve other riparian nations.  Thus 
the agreements failed to recognize the desirability of pluralism as a model to bringing stakeholders to 
the negotiating table.  Additionally, the interests of upstream states were not considered since they 
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did receive any water allocation (Dinar and Alemu 2000; Klare 2001; Tvedt 2004).  Moreover, other 
basin countries were not permitted to use the Nile headwaters for any project without the approval by 
Egypt (Collins 2002).   
The issue of Nile water rights almost brought Egypt and Ethiopia close to war in 1978 when 
President Sadat of Egypt threatened  President Mengitsu of Ethiopia for planning to build a dam on 
the Blue Nile tributary (Collins 2002).  Egypt, at the end of the pipe, depends entirely on this water 
source for its livelihood, hence it is feared that the construction of such a dam would reduce the 
amount of water that reaches Egypt.  Ethiopia, in the upstream, contributes 86 percent of the total 
water flow into the Nile and yet consumes only 1 percent from the Blue Nile, a major tributary 
emanating from within its territory (Okidi 1994; Collins 2002).  Given the high stakes, and the fact 
that for a long time Ethiopia has attempted to construct dams to generate power and to irrigate 
farmlands, one would hope that the country‘s Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) take the 
center stage in the matters affecting Nile water use.  Unfortunately, according to the World Bank and 
the Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat, that involvement has been missing (World Bank 2003). This 
study attempts to explore why this has been so in Ethiopia.  Hence the following research questions 
are explored: 
1) What are the characteristics of the power structures of the Nile Basin Initiative as they relate 
to stakeholder involvement in Ethiopia? 
2)  For those not involved in the decision-making process, what constraints prevent them from 
getting a „seat at the table?”  
3) Do the power structure characteristics in Ethiopia relate to pluralism and, if so, how?  
4) To what extent are conditions in Ethiopia compatible with the prerequisites of pluralism? 
 
To answer these research questions, the existence and the characteristics of pluralist power 
structures in the Nile Basin Initiative and Ethiopia are analyzed, including the extent to which the 
conditions in Ethiopia are compatible with the prerequisites of pluralism.  In addition to the power 
structures, Rational Decision Making Model is analyzed to understand the stages of decision-making 
in which Ethiopia‘s NGO representatives are either included or left out within the existing NBI 
power structures.  
 
Theoretical Frameworks 
Understanding stakeholder involvement in public issues continues to attract a broad body of literature 
as well as theoretical frameworks. The application of theories to explain, analyze and to predict a 
phenomena is by and large determined by its social, economic or political dimensions and the 
practicality of the theory to provide a more robust explanation compared to the others. For example, 
theoretical frameworks such as the Institutional Analysis and Development (Olson 1965), Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (Ostrom 1990), and Pluralist Theory (Dahl 1961) have found relevance in the 
analysis of stakeholder involvement in the decisions that affect water rights.  Each of these theories is 
briefly explained below. 
 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) 
The IAD provides a conceptual map that allows for the identification of an action arena in order ―to 
analyze, predict, and explain behavior within institutional arrangements‖ (Ostrom 2007, 28).  Ostrom 
goes on to suggest that Action arenas ―include an action situation and the actors in that situation‖ 
(28).  An Action situation includes participants, positions, outcomes, action-outcome linkages, the 
control that participants exercise, information, and the costs and benefits assigned to outcomes, while 
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the Actors in the situation embodies ―the resources that an actor brings to a situation; the valuation 
actors assign to states of the world and to actions; the way actors acquire, process, retain, and use 
knowledge contingencies and information; and the processes actors use for selection of particular 
course of action‖ (Ostrom 2007, 28).  The framework can be employed to determine who, among the 
stakeholders, is eligible for involvement in the policymaking process, including the rules of that 
guide that activity.   
 
 Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
This theoretical framework was developed by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994) to help understand 
the complex policy processes that involve conflicts over goals, technical disputes, and the role that 
multiple actors and science and technology play in the determination of policy outcomes.  At the core 
of the ACF are five assumptions: First, policymaking takes place at the subsystem level (i.e., 
government agencies, judicial institutions, scientists and research community, consultants, interest 
groups, and the media). The subsystem coalitions occur because, in the words of Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1835), they enable people with unlike minds but with unified interest to confront 
complex issues such as water rights. Moreover, it is only through this type of synergy that the 
coalition can hope to make significant influence on matters affecting their interests.  
 The other assumption is an individual member of a coalition is primarily driven by a 
normative belief system, rather than by rational self-interest (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994).  This 
implies that advocacy coalitions have the tendency to defer to the heuristics to guide policymaking.  
Moreover, the belief systems tend to be stable over time therefore the ideal policy change should 
minimally take place 10 years or more.  The third assumption holds that it is through scientific 
research and information technology that the normative beliefs among coalition participants can be 
modified, hence the importance of including researchers and consultants into the policymaking. 
 Despite its usefulness in the assessment of the degree of coalition involvement in the policy 
process, the framework has been criticized for assuming that any advocacy coalition will marshal 
their way through regardless of restrictive political conditions.  Besides, such subsystems, at least in 
developing countries, tend to be weak given the lack of capacity and strenuous relationships with 
governments (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994). Another criticism of the ACF is the belief that 
multiple decision venues, akin to the American pluralist structures, will guarantee involvement in 
policy decisions. Not only that, another strand of argument that points to the weakness of both IAD 
and ACF is provided by Ostrom (Schlager 2007). According to Ostrom, ―Frameworks organize 
inquiry, but they cannot in and of themselves provide explanations for, or predictions of, behavior 
and outcomes. Explanation and prediction lie in the realm of theories and models‖ (2007, 293). 
These limitations provide the rationale to apply the Pluralist Theory and the Rational Decision Model 
to this study.  
 
Pluralism and Stakeholder Involvement 
Pluralism is based on the notion that in any representative democracy, power is distributed equally 
between organized groups and that these groups will compete for resources with which to influence 
policy decisions (Presthus 1964; Dahl 1967).  In this article, power is understood to mean ―political 
space‖ or legal authority accorded public officials and organized groups in the decision-making 
processes affecting issue-areas in the community or within organizations.  In an ideal contemporary 
democracy, political space is generally provided through diffused power structures and participatory 
practices (Dahl 1989).  Under a strict pluralist model, power structures that provide avenues for 
broad citizen involvement include decentralization, representation, autonomy, mediation, procedures, 
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and involvement mechanisms (Wildavsky 1964; DeLeon 1993; Bowler and Hanneman 2006).  
When these structures are in place, benefits such as citizen support, trust, and legitimacy of public 
programs are enhanced (Sabatier et al. 2005). However, when structures such as centralization and 
bureaucratization (i.e., rules, procedures, and hierarchies) dominate, mistrust or even conflicts can 
result (Bruch et al. 2005; Edelenbos and Klijn 2005).   While political theorists, including Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1835), have contended that pluralist structures are the most critical variable to ensuring 
broad-based involvement, others in the same school of thought have asserted that greater 
involvement is only possible when such structures function well (C. J. Fox, personal communication, 
September  10, 2007). In essence, pluralist structure is not a sufficient condition for greater 
stakeholder involvement.  In fact, Theodore Lowi (1979) has argued that pluralism, and by extension 
diffused structures, can inhibit broad involvement because there is a tendency for the most influential 
associations to act in oligopolistic manner. Lowi adds that plural structures act to slow down the 
decision process and thereby compromises efficiency of the process or even the outcome.   
 Despite Lowi‘s views, separate studies by Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman (1960), 
Robert Dahl (1961), and Aaron Wildavsky (1964) have confirmed that pluralist power structures 
leads to greater stakeholder involvement in community issue-areas compared to elitist ones.  This 
article replicates the approach used by these researchers in order to establish the links between two 
major variables: ―pluralist structures‖ (Independent Variable) and ―greater stakeholder involvement‖ 
(Dependent Variable) in relation to the NBI‘s Water Resources Planning and Management Project 
(WRPM) in Ethiopia.   
 
Rational Decision-Making Model 
Rational decision-making model is incorporated as one of the analytical lens through which 
involvement in different stages of decision-making can be understood.  Three reasons justify the 
model‘s inclusion.  First, the model‘s decision stages, including identification of goals, developing 
alternative solutions, implementing program solutions, and evaluating outcomes, provide systematic 
means to analyzing the areas in which involvement by various actors can occur.  Second, despite the 
criticisms labeled against the model such as the difficulty of amassing all the information to assess 
policy alternatives and to select the most optimum decision, this approach and its decision procedures 
are frequently used to support political processes (Denis et al. 2006).  Third, in a bureaucratic 
institution such as the NBI, which is also a politically instituted body, the model is assumed to be the 
modus operandi for making decisions. Therefore, the NBI is presumed to have some elements of the 
rational approach at the bureaucratic level and pluralist ones at the political level.  Furthermore, the 
blending of the two theoretical models is anchored on previous studies that have linked pluralism and 
decision-making capacity and outcomes (Underdal 1973).  Hence the integrated framework (Figure 
1) provides an analytical lens through which the degree of involvement by various stakeholders can 
be better understood. 
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Figure 1.  Pluralism and Rational Decision-Making Conceptual Framework 
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Measures of Pluralism  
Two levels of measurements of pluralism are applied in this study.  
1. Organizational level (Dahl cited in Newton 1969, 212; Kim and Bell 1985). The following 
measures are used: representation; multiple centers of power; autonomy (of 
nongovernmental organizations); and involvement mechanisms (e.g. information , meetings) 
2. National Level (Lineberry and Sharkansky 1971; DeLeon 1993).  The main indicator is the 
presence of the ―Prerequisites of Pluralism‖ whose measures are:  decentralized power 
structures; heterogeneous population, large sized and autonomous NGOs, existence of strong 
labor unions, diversified economy, information accessibility, and competitive party politics. 
 
Measures of Rational Decision-Making 
The measures of involvement in decision-making through the Rational Approach include the extent 
to which stakeholders are invited to be part of: problem identification and defining goals and 
objectives; coming up with alternative solutions; planning of project implementation; developing 
monitoring procedures and part of the process; and evaluation process (Hoy and Tarter 2004). 
 
Method of the Study 
An inductive qualitative research design was employed because of the exploratory nature of the 
study.  This study was guided by two hypotheses: 1) Non-governmental Organizations have not been 
a central element in the NBI policy decisions, and 2) Pluralist structures lead to greater stakeholder 
involvement.    
 
Data Collection  
The sample population consisted of nongovernmental stakeholders (NGOs) in Ethiopia who 
were either involved or had interest in the decision-making processes of the Nile Basin Initiative.  
A comprehensive list and contacts of all registered NGOs in Ethiopia was obtained from 
Christian Relief and Development Association, an umbrella organization for registered NGOs in 
Ethiopia.  A similar list was obtained from the NBI headquarters in Uganda.  Other sources included 
published documents, email inquiries, and electronic copies of newsletters.  The next step involved 
the recruitment of key informants from the list.  
 The Reputational Approach was used to identify the key informants.  The approach first 
involved the engagement of a particular panel of informants (or ―judges‖) to identify who the 
informants should be.  This approach was initially applied by Floyd Hunter (1963) in his study of 
community power structures and has subsequently been used in similar studies (Lineberry and 
Sharkansky 1971).  It is premised on the assumption that a cautiously selected panel of informants 
will be familiar with individuals who are influential and those who are not (McCool 1995).  As 
applied in this article, this approach involved three steps.  First, a basic list of 20 influential officials 
of the NBI in Entebbe, Uganda (i.e., Secretariat headquarters) and another 40 NGO officials in 
Ethiopia were developed.  Second, a ―short list‖ of a panel of judges was put together.  The panel, 
consisting of five (n = 5) in each country, involved individuals of authority as determined by their 
positions within the community or organizations.  It was assumed that leaders of governmental 
institutions have power, influence, keep good records, and have the knowledge of what is going on in 
the community (Lineberry and Sharkansky 1971).  The nomination of the judges was also based on 
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the willingness to serve on the panel.  It was obvious that those who made the final list held top 
positions in the NBI Secretariat in Uganda, the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office in Addis 
Ababa, and from selected NGOs in Ethiopia.  
             
The third step involved asking the judges to independently identify 10 individuals out of 20 
perceived to have ―power‖ and ―influence‖ over NBI issues.  The same process was repeated in 
Ethiopia except were asked to identify 20 out of 40 on the list.  According to Clelland and Form 
(1968, 83), one‘s degree of influence can be assessed by her role in ―a number of community issues 
or projects.‖ In a study of New Haven, Connecticut, Dahl (1961) applied the same concept of 
―relative influence‖ to identify leaders who had more influence than others in the community.  The 
approach has been replicated in later studies (Sayre and Kaufman 1960; Wildavsky 1964).   
                   
To assist the panel of judges with their selection of key informants, the following instruction used by 
Hunter (1963, 258), albeit tailored to this research, was replicated:  
 Suppose a major project were before a community or organization, one that required a 
decision by a group of leaders whom nearly everyone would accept. Which 10 people out of 
this list of 20 would you choose to make up this group regardless of whether or not you know 
them personally? Please include any other person who you think should be on the list and the 
reasons why. Next, rank order. The judges were verbally requested not to share their choices 
with others. 
Once the process was complete, the lists were tallied. Only individuals with most nominations were 
selected to serve as key informants. Consequently, a total of 30 key (Uganda, 10; Ethiopia, 20) 
informants were interviewed face-to-face using open-ended questions. The Uganda-based informants 
were mainly members of the NBI Secretariat. The interviews with Secretariat officials focused 
mainly on the history of involvement as well as the framework used to engage stakeholders.  
Archival data, including memos and meeting records, were examined to determine the trend of 
involvement by relevant actors. In Ethiopia, the interviewees consisted of NGO officials, with 
additional representatives of the NBI, and other international organizations. All were based in the 
capital, Addis Ababa. The objective was to know in which decision stages, if any, they have been 
involved, and the reasons for noninvolvement in others. 
 
Data Analysis  
An inductive process was used to analyze the qualitative data. First, the interviews were 
transcribed, followed by the development of a codebook to help organize the data into ‗chunks‘ or 
categories.  Second, the unstructured data were downloaded into Software for Qualitative Research 
(QSR NVivo7) for further synthesis and identification of emerging themes. Third, claims about the 
relationships among the emerging themes were made. 
 
Findings 
 The findings in relation to each of the research questions are summarized below. 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the power structures of the Nile Basin initiative as they relate 
to stakeholder involvement in Ethiopia?  
8
African Social Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 [2014], Art. 7
http://digitalscholarship.bjmlspa.tsu.edu/assr/vol6/iss1/7
African Social Science Review   Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 2013 
103 
 
Evidence from the interviews and archival data showed that the NBI in Ethiopia is characterized by 
two power structures: decentralized and centralized. On the one hand, the NBI‘s Shared Vision and 
Subsidiary programs are decentralized at the regional, national and local levels. The purpose is to 
bring the NBI project activities closer to the stakeholders. To some extent, they have enhanced 
awareness and stakeholder involvement. For example, about two-dozen community- based 
organizations have benefited from micro-grant projects funded by the NBI, including 
involvement in project identification, and to some degree, in the monitoring and evaluation 
activities.  However, such level of involvement was found to be missing in the Water Resources 
Planning and Management Project (WRPMP) — the issue-area investigated in this study.  
 On the other hand, the actual exercise of decision-making was found to be highly 
centralized. This was the dominant view of the informants in Uganda and Ethiopia.  As a senior 
NBI official confirmed, ―We are more inclined to a centralized decision-making with all 
sincerity… If you look at projects supported by UNOPS, the decision[s] [are] still centered with 
the project managers.  If you look at the organs like Technical Advisory Committees … the level 
of openness here is still low.‖ Another informant in Uganda observed that ―It is still a very 
government thing.  It is a bureaucratic kind of institution.  If the Nile Council of Ministers 
doesn‘t say ABCD, then ABCD won‘t be done…‖ Moreover, the decisions affecting project 
identification, alternative solutions, program implementation, monitoring and evaluation relative 
to the WRPMP were highly centralized. It was further noted that only the project and designated 
government officials were involved in the process; NGOs were invited only as observers. 
 
 2. For those not involved in the decision-making process, what constraints prevent them 
from getting a „seat at the table‟? 
 Politics was the most important constraint to involvement.  In particular, the NGOs decried the 
lack of political space and support. The delay in the registration process, as in the case of the 
Ethiopian Nile Basin Discourse, further inhibited their ability to engage in the decision-making 
processes. Besides, the NBI officials claimed that decision-making was solely a government 
prerogative.  As one senior NBI official stated, ―When you talk about government, this is high 
level.  We have ministers, the technical committee and the secretariat. We cannot invite NGOs to 
the management meetings of the secretariat. There is no way.‖ NGOs were viewed by the NBI 
officials as confrontational and hence treated as enemies rather than as allies. This has further 
strained the relations between the NGOs and NBI officials.  
Another constraint was lack of capacity among the NGOs. First, the channels of 
information sharing with the civil society were found to be limited. The NBI‘s apparent faith in 
its website as a means of keeping the stakeholders informed was considered inappropriate 
because rural-based NGOs in Ethiopia did not have internet access. Additionally, some of the 
NGOs located in Addis Ababa, the capital city, lacked the resources for internet access. 
Similarly, most of the information distributed by the NBI was considered too technical and not 
user-friendly. In order to address this problem, the Nile Transboundary Environmental Action 
Project, for example, embarked on translating a NBI newsletter into the local Amharic language. 
This has reportedly improved awareness about NBI activities among several NGOs. Inadequate 
funding to the NGOs also weakened their capacity to attend NBI activities or to organize training 
for their own staff. 
9
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Additional problem was the location of the power structures and their characteristics. For 
example, most of the NBI projects in Ethiopia were found to be concentrated in the capital city. 
Therefore, NGOs outside of Addis Ababa must have the time and resources to travel great 
distances to participate in the NBI decision processes if and when they are invited. Moreover, for 
those who got invited involvement in the process was limited by the existing hierarchical 
structure, decision rules, and their own lack of technical knowledge of the issues discussed.  
Another related structural problem was the lack of involvement framework that is 
inclusive of the stakeholders. Currently, the framework provides for direct involvement by 
bureaucratic elites (NBI professionals), political elites (government officials), and non-
institutional professional elites (consultants, donors); see the concentric circles in Figure 2. Each 
concentric circle represents a type of stakeholder. In the inner circle is the NBI Secretariat where 
all the decision agendas are formulated and finalized. Closer to the NBI is the government that 
consists of the Nile Council of Ministers (Nile-COM) and the Technical Advisory Committee 
(Nile-TAC). Next are the donors and consultants. Outside that circle is the Nile Basin Discourse, 
an umbrella organization presumed to represent the welfare of the NGOs with interest in the NBI 
affairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Current Involvement Framework 
  
   
  NBI 
NGO Networks 
Donors/Consultants 
Government 
Nile Basin Discourse (NBD) 
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On the outermost circle is the NGO network with interests in the Nile. Thus the nearer one is to 
the NBI Secretariat the more likely direct involvement in the decision-making is guaranteed. The 
converse is also true. The further out one is the less likely involvement is assured. 
 
3.  Do the power structure characteristics in Ethiopia relate to pluralism and, if so, how? 
In order to answer this question, the following framework initially applied by Wildavsky 
(Hawley and Wirt 1968), albeit tailored to this study, was adopted: a) If it is found that the same 
group, the NBI, the power elites or the NGOs, exercise direct influence in most or all the 
decision-making processes of the WRPMP‘s project components, then it can be concluded that 
power elite structure exists; b) If involvement overlaps and varies from issue to issue, and from 
one decision process to another, then it can be inferred that a pluralist structure exists. According 
to Wildavsky (Hawley 1968) and Dahl (1961), this conclusion is arrived at when no one group 
dominates influence in all decision-making areas. 
  Based on the above analytical criteria, two diametrically opposed power structure 
characteristics were evident. First, a centralized (or elitist) structure was found to exist given the 
fact that the NBI and its affiliated elites dominate most of the decision-making processes.  As 
two officials of the NBI Secretariat and the WRPMP affirmed, ―On the Policy, Good Practices 
and Support component of the project, the formulation has been to a large extent done by 
professionals… We principally work with the government. I don‘t think we have realized the 
benefits of what we are doing until NGOs get involved.‖ Second, some involvement overlap was 
evident at the implementation stage, especially for the Water Resources Planning component at 
the local levels.  Other decision stages such as program formulation, finding alternatives, and 
evaluation are dominated by the elites (i.e., consultants, bureaucrats, and government officials). 
This overlap, although somewhat limited, is evidence of a pluralist structure.   
The existence of centralized/elitist structures alongside pluralist ones brings to the fore a 
contradiction between structures and functions. On the one hand, Ethiopia‘s federal constitution 
mandates pluralist structures that allow organized groups to form and operate. On the other hand, 
the functions of these structures are restricted either by mandates of the same government or by 
bureaucratic inertia. The irony of this trajectory is that the expectations for involvement are laid 
down by the structures but in practice they function differently, thereby limiting NGO 
involvement. 
  
4. To what extent are conditions in Ethiopia compatible with the prerequisites of 
pluralism?  
Information about whether conditions in Ethiopia are compatible with the prerequisites of 
pluralism was obtained from the literature, but some additional comments from the key 
informants also were considered in this regard. Generally, and as reported earlier in this article, a 
democratic pluralist society should, at the minimum, have the following attributes: decentralized 
power structures, diversified and heterogeneous population; diversified economy; reasonable 
level of industrialization; strong labor unions; large-sized and autonomous NGOs; competitive 
party politics; involvement mechanisms; information accessibility; and, policy influence by 
organized groups. The analyses of archival documents and responses by key informants show a 
―strong‖ presence of decentralized power structures at the national level and heterogeneous 
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population, and a ―weak presence‖ of the other attributes.  A brief explanation follows. 
 Ethiopia‘s political structure is federal, with nine autonomous Regional States (United 
Nations Public Administration Network 2008). This means that the nine regional states make 
independent decisions and at same time have equal representation in the Federal government. 
The country is heterogeneous in nature, with seventy-three ethnic groups that speak different 
languages, practice different religions, and have the right to engage in different forms of 
economic activities. The population was estimated at 79 million (World Health Organization 
2009) at the time of this study was conducted. In addition, organized groups can form and 
operate as nongovernmental organizations. Although labor unions and NGOs form, their size and 
freedom of operation were restricted. As one of the informants in Ethiopia stated, ―I don‘t know 
if labor unions are active at all in this country. They are at the margin. The regional unions, the 
teacher unions, and others don‘t have much weight here.‖ Thus, even though diffused power 
structures are present in Ethiopia, NGOs and labor unions do not have the latitude to use them 
freely. This undermines competition and bargaining which are key elements of a well-
functioning pluralistic society. Evidence further indicates that the government of Ethiopia is 
restrictive and distrustful of organized groups. This hostile treatment of organized groups has 
historical precedence and continues without adequate checks and balances. For example, under 
the imperial regime of Haile Sellasie operations of NGOs were very much restricted (Klare 
2001); the restriction continued with Presidents Haile Mariam Mengistu and Meles Zenawi 
according to the Key Informant testimonies availed to the researcher.  
 The latest litmus test of the willingness to widen space for organized groups in Ethiopia 
can be seen through the passage of the ‗Charities and Societies Proclamation, No. 00/2008‘ in 
January 2009.  Section 1, Article 2, of that law stipulates that a locally registered NGO shall not 
receive more than 10 percent of its annual funding from outside sources.  Given that the majority 
of NGO receive over 90 percent of their funding from external sources, this law will limit their 
capacity to operate and build effective partnerships to mobilize resources, and reduce incentives 
to organize and assemble. One NGO affected by this mandate, which works with the NBI to 
implement projects, is the Ethiopian Nile Basin Discourse Forum (EtNBDF).The EtNBDF 
founded in 2005 and it receives most of its funding from external sources (Technical Analysis of 
Second Draft Proclamation 2008).   
Section 7, Article 93, Sub Article 1 of the law states that a federal body has the right to 
suspend, remove and replace an NGO officer (Technical Analysis of Second Draft of 
Proclamation 2008). This undermines the autonomy of civic organizations, and potentially opens 
doors for abuse by the supervising federal agency. As noted earlier, autonomy is one of the 
prerequisites of pluralism within a democracy. Section 10, Article 107, of that legislation further 
declares that any person who prints, publishes, displays, sells or exposes for sale, or transmits 
information through the post or any electronic media, in the interests of any ―unlawful charity‖ 
or society shall be punishable with a fine not less than Birr 3,000 (US $166 at September 2012 
Exchange Rate) and not exceeding Birr 5,000 (US $277) and by a simple imprisonment of not 
less than three years and not exceeding five years, provided the criminal code does not prescribe 
a more severe penalty. As defined by the legislation, unlawful organizations include unregistered 
NGOs. In this respect, the Ethiopian Nile Basin Discourse Forum—not registered since its 
founding in 2005 but continues to work with the Nile Basin Initiative on outreach and 
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implementation of community-based investment projects—stands to be victimized.  
  In light of the legislation, a senior NBI official in Ethiopia commented that, ―The 
government wishes to control NGOs, particularly those whose areas of operation include human 
rights and governance… At the core, government wants to be sure that these NGOs receiving 
external funding are not spies… Civil society is perceived as a problem; it is better to deal with 
them by the book.‖ 
 
Discussion 
According to Alexis de Tocqueville (1835), pluralism has three potential benefits: the ability to 
unite the efforts of unlike minds; the creation of points of action and action strategies through the 
power of meetings; and enabling the actors to select representatives to influence public policy. 
How then do the pluralist power structures within the NBI‘s WRPM project in Ethiopia measure 
up to the Tocquevillean ideals? On the ability to unite unlike minds, the study informants argued 
that this is unlikely until an official arrangement such as memorandum of understanding between 
the NGOs and the NBI is formalized. Even then, it will take overhauling of the individual 
attitudes within the NBI and the political leadership of Ethiopia to make that possible. At the 
time of this study, the government of Melles Zenawi was mentioned by the participants as hostile 
to NGOs. Similarly, the NBI officials were accused of being manipulative and evasive instead of 
being receptive to organized groups.  
 On the second criteria, or the creation of points of action in which the nongovernmental 
stakeholders could come together with the NBI officials to discuss policy issues and to make 
joint decisions, several power structures at the national level have been instituted. The problem 
however is that these structures are basically centered at the capital city, Addis Ababa. With lack 
of financial resources, it is not possible for rural-based NGOs to participate actively. Moreover, 
as noted in the findings, those power structures are meaningless when NGO representatives are 
invited only as observers. On third criteria, representation was found to be limited to the 
leadership of the Nile Basin Discourse, an umbrella body for all NGOs in the Nile Basin 
countries.  
Generally in Ethiopia, the prerequisites of pluralism do exist as evident in the findings.  
However, internal pluralism is simply a style of government. But because the NBI is an 
extension of government within Ethiopia‘s power structure, the question that must be asked is, 
―whose interests are being represented?‖ In the pluralist view, right now only the interests of 
government leadership are being considered as the evidence presented by the informants clearly 
attest. Similarly, the viability of Ethiopia‘s pluralist structures is further put to test by the new 
legislation that disenfranchises NGOs with a real stake in the NBI‘s national projects.  The so-
called Charities and Societies Proclamation law potentially restricts plural power structures in 
Ethiopia, and thus limits the ability of interest groups to organize internally and consequently 
crippling the NBI and NGO functions. As several scholars, cited earlier, have found in their 
research of community power structures, an open and equitable access to decision-making by 
nongovernmental stakeholders can increase the chances of achieving community program goals. 
But achieving such equity requires a democratic system of public management that promotes and 
ensures representation of all those who have a stake in a public issue. Unfortunately, for the NBI 
it is a Catch-22.  On the one hand, it is possible to democratize involvement procedures.  On the 
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other hand, those procedures can be prevented from use by an authoritarian government that 
deems openness as a threat to the status quo. This is exactly what was observed of Ethiopia 
during and after the field research. Ethiopia was then under President Zenawi whom research 
informants accused of heavy-handedness in his leadership style.   
Equity is even more difficult when NGOs are viewed with suspicion by the sitting 
government.  Consequently, this kind of political atmosphere makes it daunting for the NBI to 
implement democratic values within its power structure. As one participant in Ethiopia 
acknowledged, the political environment instills some fear in the officials of the WRPMP hence 
the strategies that they adopt, including the engagement of stakeholders, must often avoid 
confrontation with the government.   
 Substantively, pluralism is a procedural theory concerned with the decision-making 
processes and how they work.  It is not enough for a government or a public agency to declare 
that it has met the pluralist requirement by simply establishing laws that allow groups to form.  
Certainly, there is a difference between structures and functions. On the converse, there are 
certain similarities in the way pluralism is defined and structured.  But the operationalization of 
those structures, as this study shows, can be influenced by contextual variables such as past 
history of involvement, the nature of NGO-government relationships, and the attitudes of water 
agency officials toward NGOs as the case the NBI in Ethiopia has shown. 
Nonetheless, given that the NBI is an international body with diplomatic privileges, it 
seems reasonable to expect the officials to intervene directly or indirectly on behalf of its 
national institutions or other organized groups, if expected outcomes of the funded projects are to 
be achieved. Therefore, enhanced involvement in the WRPMP components will be dependent, to 
a large extent, not on the question of institutional efficiency but on the practical application of 
equity, fairness, and democratic openness. These observations thus lead this study to hypothesize 
that there is a relationship between the exercise of pluralism and the degree of democratic 
openness that exists among the political leadership at any given time, whether in pluralist or 
centralized/elitist system.  
 
Recommendations 
This study has reported some of the challenges facing NGOs with interest in the affairs of the 
Nile waters in Ethiopia. Apart from the desire for more funding and training opportunities, one 
issue repeated by the informants was the wish to actively get involved in the decision-making 
processes of the NBI. It is true that the power structures in Ethiopia are pluralist in nature, but the 
functionality of those structures is limited to political controls. At the NBI level, the power 
structures are similarly diffused, with project offices spread throughout the basin countries. 
However in Ethiopia, the project offices are concentrated in the capital city, hierarchical, and 
engage selected NGO representatives only as observers. 
 It is therefore recommended that the presence of power structures must be complimented 
with an inclusive framework that defines the responsibilities of each of the actors (i.e., NBI 
officials, policy makers, consultants, and NGOs). Figure 3 shows the link between the current 
and the recommended framework. The concentric circles to the left show the current 
involvement structure in which the NBI officials and those closer to the inner circle have the 
involvement structure in which the NBI officials and those closer to the inner circle have the 
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privilege to participate in the decisions made by the water agency. In other words, one‘s chance 
to get involved in the decision-making process is enhanced by the proximity to the inner circle. 
That framework thus leaves the NGOs at the margin of decision-making.  An ideal structure is 
depicted by the concentric circles to the right in which all the actors are equidistant to the 
decision-making table, and thus jointly contribute to the process. 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Circle of Involvement—Inclusion Model 
Conclusion 
The goal of this study was to assess whether the presence or absence of pluralist structures 
explains the missing involvement by nongovernmental organizations in the decision-making 
processes of Ethiopia‘s NBI project. That assessment was driven by two hypotheses: One, 
nongovernmental organizations have not been a central element in the NBI decision-making; 
two, pluralist structures lead to greater involvement by stakeholders. The following conclusions 
are made with respect to the research questions, stated earlier in the article, and the two 
hypotheses.   
With respect to the first research question, ―What are the characteristics of the power 
structures of the Nile Basin Initiative as they relate to stakeholder involvement in Ethiopia?‖, the 
study concludes that the existence of contradictory power structures, pluralist and elitist, do not make 
it any easier for stakeholders to get involved in decisions. This is because the elitist power structures 
privilege those at the top with decision powers, while the pluralist structures serve as instruments of 
political window dressing.  Consequently, NGO representatives are invited only as observers and not 
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as active participants. 
As to what constraints prevent NGOs from getting a ‗seat at the table‘, this study 
concludes that politics is at the top of the list of deterrents. With Ethiopia‘s NGOs viewed with 
suspicion and hostility by the government, it is often difficult to bring the two actors to the table.  
The limited space thus provided only allow for observers with no significant influence. 
Moreover, the government views decision-making as her prerogative. As one NBI senior official 
quipped: ―We cannot invite NGOs to the management meetings, there is no way.‖ To further 
constrict the political space, Ethiopia‘s government has, under the immediate past President 
Meles Zenawi, made it bureaucratically difficult for organized groups to get registered, in 
addition to the passage of a 2008 law that demarcates between a regular NGO or ―a foreign 
agent‖ based on the sources of funding. This kind of approach to dealing with NGOs as enemies 
and not as allies, whether in pluralist or elitist structures, defeats the purpose of collective 
responsibility in the management shared water resources. 
As to whether pluralist structures in Ethiopia relate to pluralism, evidence supports the 
conclusion that while the constitution and national government structures mandate pluralism, the 
functions of those structures are guarded by political and bureaucratic elites through non-
inclusive rules and procedures. The irony of this trajectory is that the expectations for 
involvement are laid down by the structure but in practice function differently, thereby limiting 
involvement. And whether the conditions in Ethiopia are compatible with prerequisites of 
pluralism, evidence support the inference that internal pluralism is simply a style of government. 
But because the NBI is an extension of government within Ethiopia‘s power structure, the 
question that must be asked is, ―whose interests are being represented?‖ In the pluralist view, 
right now only the interests of government leadership are being considered. 
Do the results of this study support the hypotheses? The premise that NGOs have not 
been a central element in the NBI decision-making processes is validated by the informant data. 
However, the study does not confirm the second hypothesis that pluralism leads to greater 
involvement. As stated at the beginning of this article, pluralism as a theoretical framework has 
been previously employed, at least by Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman (1960), Robert Dahl 
(1961), Floyd Hunter (1963), and Aaron Wildavsky (1964), to successfully determine the 
positive relationship between pluralist structures and enhanced stakeholder involvement. 
However, as the case of Ethiopia illustrates, the efficacy of pluralist structures as the mechanism 
for enhanced stakeholder involvement requires more than the constitution or the rules and 
procedures. Instead, such level of involvement is influenced by contextual variables such as past 
history of involvement, the nature of NGO-government relationships, and the attitudes of water 
agency officials toward the NGOs.   
Therefore two important implications of this study to research and water governance can 
be drawn. First is the misplaced body of literature that situates pluralism at the core of enhanced 
universal stakeholder involvement. Substantively, pluralism is a procedural theory concerned 
with the decision-making processes and how they work. Therefore it is insufficient for a 
government or a public agency to declare that it has met the pluralist requirement by simply 
establishing laws that allow groups to form. Additionally, the creation of pluralist structures does 
not by itself guarantee stakeholder involvement. Instead, what is critical is the access to the ‗seat 
at the table‘ that those structures provide. In the NBI situation where bureaucratic inertia and 
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heavy political handedness are the norm, democratic openness, simplified rules for participation, 
and incentives such as information availability, funding, and capacity building can remedy the 
dismal levels of involvement  Another study outcome that can contribute to involvement is the 
change of attitude towards NGOs.  Development, and in particular the management of shared 
water resources, requires collective action. Therefore the water agency officials should work 
with NGOs as partners rather than view them with suspicion and as enemies. Moreover, it is not 
sufficient to invite NGO representatives as observers to the decision-making processes. The 
unintended consequence of the observer status is the increased level of mistrust and the omission 
of invaluable input from the grassroots level that have the potential to improve decision 
outcomes.  
 Lastly, there were two limitations to this study. The qualitative approach to the collection 
and analysis of data, while useful, narrowed the depth of analysis as well as the results that a 
survey approach would have produced.  For example, the results of a survey data would have 
made it possible to determine the statistical significance of ―politics‖ as the top constraint to 
involvement vis-à-vis other impediments. Another limitation was the application of western-
based prerequisites and indicators of pluralism in a developing country context. Such ―foreign‖ 
lenses, when used in a country such as Ethiopia, have the potential to skew the reality on the 
ground. These limitations can form the basis for future research. 
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